An epistemological issue concerns the question of what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline. A particularly central issue in this context is the question of whether the social world can and should be studied according to the same principles, procedures, and ethos as the natural sciences. The position that affi rms the importance of imitating the natural sciences is invariably associated with an epistemological position known as positivism (see Key concept 2.2).

A natural science epistemology: positivism The doctrine of positivism is extremely diffi cult to pin down and therefore to outline in a precise manner, because it is used in a number of different ways by authors. For some writers, it is a descriptive category—one that describes a philosophical position that can be discerned in research—though there are still disagreements about what it comprises; for others, it is a pejorative term used to describe crude and often superfi cial data collection. It is possible to see in the fi ve principles in Key concept 2.2 a link with some of the points that have already been raised about the relationship between theory and research. For example, positivism entails elements of both a deductive approach (principle 2) and an inductive strategy (principle 3). Also, a fairly sharp distinction is drawn between theory and research. The role of research is to test theories and to provide material for the development of laws. But either of these connections between theory and research carries with it the implication that it is possible to collect observations in a manner that is not infl uenced by pre-existing theories. Moreover, theoretical terms that are not directly amenable to observation are not considered genuinely scientifi c; they must be susceptible to the rigours of observation. All this carries with it the implication of greater epistemological status being given to observation than to theory. It should be noted that it is a mistake to treat positivism as synonymous with science and the scientifi c. In fact, philosophers of science and of the social sciences differ quite sharply over how best to characterize scientifi c practice, and since the early 1960s there has been a drift away from viewing it in positivist terms. Thus, when writers complain about the limitations of positivism, it is not entirely clear whether they mean the philosophical term or a scientifi c approach more generally. Realism (in particular, critical realism), for example, is another philosophical position that purports to provide an account of the nature of scientifi c practice (see Key concept 2.3). The crux of the epistemological considerations that form the central thrust of this section is the rejection by some writers and traditions of the application of the canons of the natural sciences to the study of social reality. A diffi culty here is that it is not easy to disentangle the natural science model from positivism as the butt of their criticisms. In other words, it is not always clear whether they are inveighing against the application of a general natural scientifi c approach or of positivism in particular. There is a long-standing debate about the appropriateness of the natural science model for the study of society, but, since the account that is offered of that model tends to have largely positivist overtones, it would seem that it is positivism that is the focus of attention rather than other accounts of scientifi c practice (such as critical realism—see Key concept 2.3).

Interpretivism Interpretivism is a term given to a contrasting epistemology to positivism (see Key concept 2.4). The term subsumes the views of writers who have been critical of the application of the scientifi c model to the study of the social world and who have been infl uenced by different intellectual traditions, which are outlined below. They share a view that the subject matter of the social sciences —people and their institutions—is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences. The study of the social world therefore requires a different logic of research procedure, one that refl ects the distinctiveness of humans as against the natural order. Von Wright (1971) has depicted the epistemological clash as being between positivism and hermeneutics (a term that is drawn from theology and that, when imported into the social sciences, is concerned with the theory and method of the interpretation of human action). This clash refl ects a division between an emphasis on the explanation of human behaviour that is the chief ingredient of the positivist approach to the social sciences and the understanding of human behaviour. The latter is concerned with the empathic understanding of human action rather than with the forces that are deemed to act on it. This contrast refl ects long-standing debates that precede the emergence of the modern social sciences but fi nd their expression in such notions as the advocacy by Max Weber (1864–1920) of an approach referred to in his native German as Verstehen (which means understanding). Weber (1947: 88) described sociology as a ‘science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects’. Weber’s defi nition seems to embrace both explanation and understanding here, but the crucial point is that the task of ‘causal explanation’ is undertaken with reference to the ‘interpretive understanding of social action’ rather than to external forces that have no meaning for those involved in that social action. One of the main intellectual traditions that has been responsible for the anti-positivist position has been phenomenology, a philosophy that is concerned with the question of how individuals make sense of the world around them and how in particular the philosopher should bracket out preconceptions in his or her grasp of that world. The initial application of phenomenological ideas to the social sciences is attributed to the work of Alfred Schutz (1899–1959), whose work did not come to the notice of most English-speaking social scientists until the translation from German of his major writings in the 1960s, some twenty or more years after they had been written. His work was profoundly infl uenced by Weber’s concept of Verstehen, as well as by phenomenological philosophers, like Husserl. Schutz’s position is well captured in the following passage, which has been quoted on numerous occasions: Two points are particularly noteworthy in this quotation. First, it asserts that there is a fundamental difference between the subject matter of the natural sciences and the social sciences and that an epistemology is required that will refl ect and capitalize upon that difference. The fundamental difference resides in the fact that social reality has a meaning for human beings and therefore human action is meaningful—that is, it has a meaning for them and they act on the basis of the meanings that they attribute to their acts and to the acts of others. This leads to the second point—namely, that it is the job of the social scientist to gain access to people’s ‘common-sense thinking’ and hence to interpret their actions and their social world from their point of view. It is this particular feature that social scientists claiming allegiance to phenomenology have typically emphasized. In the words of the authors of a research methods text whose approach is described as phenomenological: ‘The phenomenologist views human behavior . . . as a product of how people interpret the world. . . . In order to grasp the meanings of a person’s behavior, the phenomenologist attempts to see things from that person’s point of view’ (Bogdan and Taylor 1975: 13–14; emphasis in original). In this exposition of Verstehen and phenomenology, it has been necessary to skate over some complex issues. In particular, Weber’s examination of Verstehen is far more complex than the above commentary suggests, because the empathetic understanding that seems to be implied above was not the way in which he applied it (Bauman 1978), while the question of what is and is not a genuinely phenomenological approach to the social sciences is a matter of some dispute (Heap and Roth 1973). However, the similarity in the writings of the hermeneutic– phenomenological tradition and of the Verstehen approach, with their emphasis upon social action as being meaningful to actors and therefore needing to be interpreted from their point of view, coupled with the rejection of positivism, contributed to a stream of thought often referred to as interpretivism (e.g. J. A. Hughes 1990).

Verstehen and the hermeneutic–phenomenological tradition do not exhaust the intellectual infl uences on interpretivism. The theoretical tradition in sociology known as symbolic interactionism has also been regarded by many writers as a further infl uence. Again, the case is not clear-cut. The implications for empirical research of the ideas of the founders of symbolic interactionism, in particular George Herbert Mead (1863–1931), whose discussion of the way in which our notion of self emerges through an appreciation of how others see us, have been hotly debated. There was a school of research, known as the Iowa school, that drew heavily on Mead’s concepts and ideas, but proceeded in a direction that most people would prefer to depict as largely positivist in tone (Meltzer et al. 1975). Moreover, some writers have argued that Mead’s approach is far more consistent with a natural science approach than has typically been recognized (McPhail and Rexroat 1979). However, the general tendency has been to view symbolic interactionism as occupying similar intellectual space to the hermeneutic–phenomenological tradition and so as broadly interpretative in approach. This tendency is largely the product of the writings of Herbert Blumer, a student of Mead’s who acted as his mentor’s spokesman and interpreter, and his followers (Hammersley 1989; R. Collins 1994). Not only did Blumer coin the term symbolic interaction; he also provided a gloss on Mead’s writings that has decidedly interpretative overtones. Symbolic interactionists argue that interaction takes place in such a way that the individual is continually interpreting the symbolic meaning of his or her environment (which includes the actions of others) and acts on the basis of this imputed meaning. In research terms, according to Blumer (1962: 188), ‘the position of symbolic interaction requires the student to catch the process of interpretation through which [actors] construct their actions’, a statement that brings out clearly his views of the research implications of symbolic interactionism and of Mead’s thought. It should be appreciated that the parallelism between symbolic interactionism and the hermeneutic– phenomenological tradition should not be exaggerated. The two are united in their antipathy for positivism and have in common an interpretative stance. However, symbolic interactionism is, at least in the hands of Blumer and the many writers and researchers who have followed in his wake, a type of social theory that has distinctive epistemological implications; the hermeneutic– phenomenological tradition, by contrast, is best thought of as a general epistemological approach in its own right. Blumer may have been infl uenced by the hermeneutic– phenomenological tradition, but there is no concrete evidence of this. There are other intellectual currents that have affi nities with the interpretative stance, such as the working-through of the ramifi cations of the works of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (Winch 1958), but the hermeneutic–phenomenological, Verstehen, and symbolic interactionist traditions can be considered major infl uences. Taking an interpretative stance can mean that the researcher may come up with surprising fi ndings, or at least fi ndings that appear surprising if a largely external stance is taken—that is, a position from outside the particular social context being studied. Research in focus 2.6 provides an interesting example of this possibility. Of course, as the example in Research in focus 2.6 suggests, when the social scientist adopts an interpretative stance, he or she is not simply laying bare how members of a social group interpret the world around them. The social scientist will almost certainly be aiming to place the interpretations that have been elicited into a social scientifi c frame. There is a double interpretation going on: the researcher is providing an interpretation of others’ interpretations. Indeed, there is a third level of interpretation going on, because the researcher’s interpretations have to be further interpreted in terms of the concepts, theories, and literature of a discipline. Thus, taking the example in Research in focus 2.6, Foster’s (1995) suggestion that Riverside is not perceived as a high crime area by residents is her interpretation of her subjects’ interpretations. She then had the additional job of placing her interesting fi ndings into a social scientifi c frame, which she accomplished by relating them to existing concepts and discussions in criminology of such things as informal social control, neighbourhood watch schemes, and the role of housing as a possible cause of criminal activity. The aim of this section has been to outline how epistemological considerations—especially those relating to the question of whether a natural science approach, and in particular a positivist one, can supply legitimate knowledge of the social world—are related to research practice. There is a link with the earlier section in that a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and research is typically associated with a positivist position. Key concept 2.2 does try to suggest that inductivism is also a feature of positivism (third principle), but, in the working-through of its implementation in the practice of social research, it is the deductive element (second principle) that tends to be emphasized. Similarly, the third level of interpretation that a researcher engaged in interpretative research must bring into operation is very much part of the kind of inductive strategy described in the previous section. However, while such interconnections between epistemological issues and research practice exist, it is important not to overstate them, since they represent tendencies rather than defi nitive points of correspondence. Thus, particular epistemological principles and research practices do not necessarily go hand in hand in a neat unambiguous manner. This point will be made again on several occasions and will be a special focus of Chapter 26.

Ontological Consideration

Questions of social ontology are concerned with the nature of social entities. The central point of orientation here is the question of whether social entities can and should be considered objective entities that have a reality external to social actors, or whether they can and should be considered social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors. These positions are frequently referred to respectively as objectivism and constructionism. Their differences can be illustrated by reference to two of the most common and central terms in social science—organization and culture. Objectivism Objectivism is an ontological position that implies that social phenomena confront us as external facts that are beyond our reach or infl uence (see Key concept 2.5). We can discuss organization or an organization as a tangible object. It has rules and regulations. It adopts standardized procedures for getting things done. People are appointed to different jobs within a division of labour. There is a hierarchy. It has a mission statement. And so on. The degree to which these features exist from organization to organization is variable, but in thinking in these terms we are tending to the view that an organization has a reality that is external to the individuals who inhabit it. Moreover, the organization represents a social order in that it exerts pressure on individuals to conform to the requirements of the organization. People learn and apply the rules and regulations. They follow the standardized procedures. They do the jobs to which they are appointed. People tell them what to do and they tell others what to do. They learn and apply the values in the mission statement. If they do not do these things, they may be reprimanded or even fi red. The organization is therefore a constraining force that acts on and inhibits its members. The same can be said of culture. Cultures and subcultures can be viewed as repositories of widely shared values and customs into which people are socialized so that they can function as good citizens or as full participants. Cultures and subcultures constrain us because we internalize their beliefs and values. In the case of both organization and culture, the social entity in question comes across as something external to the actor and as having an almost tangible reality of its own. It has the characteristics of an object and hence of having an objective reality. To a very large extent, these are the ‘classic’ ways of conceptualizing organization and culture. Constructionism However, we can consider an alternative ontological position—constructionism (Key concept 2.6). This position challenges the suggestion that categories such as organization and culture are pre-given and therefore confront social actors as external realities that they have no role in fashioning. Let us take organization fi rst. Strauss et al. (1973), drawing on insights from symbolic interactionism, carried out research in a psychiatric hospital and proposed that it was best conceptualized as a ‘negotiated order’. Instead of taking the view that order in organizations is a pre-existing characteristic, they argue that it is worked at. Rules were far less extensive and less rigorously imposed than might be supposed from the classic account of organization. Indeed, Strauss et al. (1973: 308) prefer to refer to them as ‘much less like commands, and much more like general understandings’. Precisely because relatively little of the spheres of action of doctors, nurses, and other personnel was prescribed, the social order of the hospital was an outcome of agreed-upon patterns of action that were themselves the products of negotiations between the different parties involved. The social order is in a constant state of change because the hospital is ‘a place where numerous agreements are continually being terminated or forgotten, but also as continually being established, renewed, reviewed, revoked, revised. . . . In any pragmatic sense, this is the hospital at the moment: this is its social order’ (Strauss et al. 1973: 316–17). The authors argue that a preoccupation with the formal properties of organizations (rules, organizational charts, regulations, roles) tends to neglect the degree to which order in organizations has to be accomplished in everyday interaction, though this is not to say that the formal properties have no element of constraint on individual action. Much the same kind of point can be made about the idea of culture. Instead of seeing culture as an external reality that acts on and constrains people, it can be taken to be an emergent reality in a continuous state of construction and reconstruction. Becker (1982: 521), for example, has suggested that ‘people create culture continuously. . . . No set of cultural understandings . . . provides a perfectly applicable solution to any problem people have to solve in the course of their day, and they therefore must remake those solutions, adapt their understandings to the new situation in the light of what is different about it.’ Like Strauss et al., Becker recognizes that the constructionist position cannot be pushed to the extreme: it is necessary to appreciate that culture has a reality that ‘persists and antedates the participation of particular people’ and shapes their perspectives, but it is not an inert objective reality that possesses only a sense of constraint: it acts as a point of reference but is always in the process of being formed. Neither the work of Strauss et al. nor that of Becker pushes the constructionist argument to the extreme. Each admits to the pre-existence of their objects of interest (organization and culture respectively). However, in each case we see an intellectual predilection for stressing the active role of individuals in the social construction of social reality. Not all writers adopting a constructionist position are similarly prepared to acknowledge the existence or at least importance of an objective reality. Walsh (1972: 19), for example, has written that ‘we cannot take for granted, as the natural scientist does, the availability of a preconstituted world of phenomena for investigation’ and must instead ‘examine the processes by which the social world is constructed’. Constructionism essentially invites the researcher to consider the ways in which social reality is an ongoing accomplishment of social actors rather than something external to them and that totally constrains them. Constructionism also suggests that the categories that people employ in helping them to understand the natural and social world are in fact social products. The categories do not have built-in essences; instead, their meaning is constructed in and through interaction. Thus, a category like ‘masculinity’ might be treated as a social construction. This notion implies that, rather than being treated as a distinct inert entity, masculinity is construed as something whose meaning is built up during interaction. That meaning is likely to be a highly ephemeral one, in that it will vary by both time and place. This kind of stance frequently displays a concern with the language that is employed to present categories in particular ways. It suggests that the social world and its categories are not external to us, but are built up and constituted in and through interaction. This tendency can be seen particularly in discourse analysis, which is examined in Chapter 22. As Potter (1996: 98) observes: ‘The world . . . is constituted in one way or another as people talk it, write it and argue it.’ This sense of constructionism is highly antithetical to realism (see Key concept 2.3). Constructionism frequently results in an interest in the representation of social phenomena. Research in focus 2.7 provides an illustration of this idea in relation to the representation of the breast cancer epidemic in the USA. Constructionism is also frequently used as a term that refl ects the indeterminacy of our knowledge of the social world (see Key concept 2.6 and the idea of constructionism in relation to the nature of knowledge of the social world). However, in this book, I will be using the term in connection with the notion that social phenomena and categories are social constructions. Relationship to social research Questions of social ontology cannot be divorced from issues concerning the conduct of social research. Ontological assumptions and commitments will feed into the ways in which research questions are formulated and research is carried out. If a research question is formulated in such a way as to suggest that organizations and cultures are objective social entities that act on individuals, the researcher is likely to emphasize the formal properties of organizations or the beliefs and values of members of the culture. Alternatively, if the researcher formulates a research question so that the tenuousness of organization and culture as objective categories is stressed, it is likely that an emphasis will be placed on the active involvement of people in reality construction. In either case, it might be supposed that different approaches to the design of research and the collection of data will be required. Later in the book, Research in focus 20.8 provides an illustration of a study with a strong commitment to a constructionist ontology and its implications for the research process.

Research Strategy: Quantitative and qualitative reasearch

Many writers on methodological issues fi nd it helpful to distinguish between quantitative research and qualitative research. The status of the distinction is ambiguous, because it is almost simultaneously regarded by some writers as a fundamental contrast and by others as no longer useful or even simply as ‘false’ (Layder 1993: 110). However, there is little evidence to suggest that the use of the distinction is abating and even considerable evidence of its continued, even growing, currency. The quantitative/qualitative distinction will be employed a great deal in this book, because it represents a useful means of classifying different methods of social research and because it is a helpful umbrella for a range of issues concerned with the practice of social research. On the face of it, there would seem to be little to the quantitative/qualitative distinction other than the fact that quantitative researchers employ measurement and qualitative researchers do not. It is certainly the case that there is a predisposition among researchers along these lines, but many writers have suggested that the differences are deeper than the superfi cial issue of the presence or absence of quantifi cation. For many writers, quantitative and qualitative research differ with respect to their epistemological foundations and in other respects too. Indeed, if we take the areas that have been the focus of the previous three sections—the connection between theory and research, epistemological considerations, and ontological considerations—quantitative and qualitative research can be taken to form two distinctive clusters of research strategy. By a research strategy, I simply mean a general orientation to the conduct of social research. Table 2.1 outlines the differences between quantitative and qualitative research in terms of the three areas. Thus, quantitative research can be construed as a research strategy that emphasizes quantifi cation in the collection and analysis of data and that